Electronically Filed
2/13/2019 2:54 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
In Re: Board of Tax Appeals, Appeal No. 16-A1079
________________________________________

Supreme Court Docket No: 46191-2018

BRIAN STENDER, Canyon County Assessor,
Petitioner-Respondent/Cross-Appellant,
vs.
SSI FOOD SERVICES, INC.,
Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Respondent.

APPELLANT-CROSS-RESPONDENT’S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District
of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Canyon
Honorable Gene Petty Presiding

Terri Pickens Manweiler, ISB No. 5828
terri@pickenslawboise.com
Shannon N. Pearson, ISB No. 10027
shannon@pickenslawboise.com
PICKENS COZAKOS, P.A.
398 S. 9th Street, Suite 240
P.O. Box 915
Boise, Idaho 83701-0915
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant / CrossRespondent

Bryan F. Taylor, ISB No. 6400
Bradford D. Goodsell, ISB No. 3528
pacivilmail@canyonco.org
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Attorneys for Petitioner-Respondent / CrossAppellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................ 1

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL ........................................................................................................ 3

III.

ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL ......................................................................................... 3

IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL ........................................................ 3

V.

ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 3

1. Is the District Court’s Finding Regarding the 2016 Assessed Value of the Property
Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence? .................................................................. 4
A.
The Sales Comparison Approach ................................................................................. 7
B.
The Cost Approach ....................................................................................................... 8
C.
The Income Approach .................................................................................................. 9
VI.

ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL ............................................................................. 13

1. Did the District Court err in ruling that SSI was not obligated to pay penalties and
interest on the unpaid amount of property taxes ultimately owed based on the assessed value
found by the court?.................................................................................................................... 13
VII.
VIII.

ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL ..................................... 15
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 15

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Aguilar v. Coonrod, 151 Idaho 642, 646, 262 P.3d 671, 675 (2011) ........................................... 11
Canyon County Board of Equalization v. Amalgamated Sugar Company, LLC, 143 Idaho 58, 60,
137 P.3d 445, 447 (2006) ............................................................................................................ 3
Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163-64, 45 P.3d 816, 819-20 (2002) 10
Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 74, 785 P.2d 634, 638 (1990).......................................... 15
Lepper v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc., 160 Idaho 104, 369 P.3d 882 (2016) ................. 10
O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008) ..................... 10
PacifiCorp v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 153 Idaho 759, 291 P.3d 442 (2012) .......................... 4, 7
Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988 (1982)........................................... 5
Wurzburg v. Kootenai County, 155 Idaho 236, 308 P.3d 396 (Ct. App. 2013) .......................... 6, 7
Statutes
Idaho Code § 63-3812(c) .............................................................................................................. 14
Idaho Code § 63-201(12) .............................................................................................................. 13
Idaho Code § 63-201(7) ................................................................................................................ 13
Idaho Code § 63-381(d) ................................................................................................................ 14
Idaho Code § 63-3812 ................................................................................................................... 14
Idaho Code § 63-903(1) ................................................................................................................ 13
Idaho Code § 63-903(4) ................................................................................................................ 13
Idaho Code Sections 63-201, 63-903, 63-1001, and 63-3812 ........................................................ 3
Idaho Code Title 63 ...................................................................................................................... 13
Other Authorities
IDAPA ............................................................................................................................................ 6
IDAPA 35.01.03.217.02 ................................................................................................................. 7
Rules
I.A.R. 41........................................................................................................................................ 15
I.R.C.P. 26 ..................................................................................................................................... 11
I.R.C.P. 52(a) .................................................................................................................................. 5

i

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant SSI Food Services, Inc. (“SSI”) first set forth its statement of the case in its
Appellant’s Brief at pages 1-15. SSI hereby incorporates into this brief the defined terms originally
set forth in its Appellant’s Brief.
While already briefly addressed in the Appellant’s Brief, SSI elects to elaborate on the
specific issues addressed in Respondent/Cross-Appellant Canyon County’s (“Canyon County”)
Cross-Appeal, specifically the issue related to penalties and interest on taxes due. On May 15,
2018, Canyon County submitted the Affidavit of Brian Stender, requesting penalties and interest
on the amount of real property taxes due and owing by SSI as a result of the District Court’s
$17,000,000 valuation. (R., pp. 286-91). That same day, SSI filed its Objection to Request for
Penalties and Interest on Tax Due. (R., pp. 292-93). The matter was scheduled for a hearing on
June 8, 2018.

(R., pp. 296-97).

On June 1, 2018, Canyon County filed its Response to

Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and Objection to Affidavit of Brian Stender. (R., pp.
298-304).
At the hearing on June 8, 2018, SSI and Canyon County were given the opportunity to be
heard. Canyon County argued that it should be entitled to interest on the underpayment of taxes
during the pendency of the appeal to the district court. (Tr., pp. 456-459). During Canyon
County’s argument requesting interest, the District Court noted, “And the question I have, so under
63-1305 specifically interest is allowed to be ordered on a refund. Is there the reverse of that where
the code’s actually on - - allows the district court to order not only taxes be paid but interest as
well?” (Tr., p. 457, ll. 10-14). Canyon County responded:
You mean – so in – the – the County’s contention would be that while the legislature
did not address the situation where there was an underpayment and then the
taxpayer would be required to pay interest in addition to the – the amount, we
believe that it would be – that the silence of the legislature would not be negative,
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I suppose you’d say, but would be – that the equitable reading would be that it
would go both ways, I guess would be the way to put it.
That if the taxpayer underpaid, the taxpayer then ought to pay the full amount plus
interest. If the taxpayer overpaid, the County refunds with interest.
(Tr., p. 457, ll. 15-25). SSI, of course, disagreed. SSI responded:
To answer the court’s question, no, there isn’t a statute that gives the County the
right to charge interest on underpayments. And there is mechanism for which the
County can do that. They can charge interest if it’s not paid when due. When due.
So that’s a very critical factor in this particular case.
…
CTI paid all taxes when due, CTI paid on the $18 million, which gave CTI a credit
and, under the statute, with interest on that credit. That credit applied in 2017. The
CTI taxes for 2017 were paid on time when due based on the Board of Tax Appeals
and a stipulation between the parties as to what they would pay in 2017. In 2018,
Your Honor, CTI has paid their taxes as applied when due. There are no unpaid late
taxes for CTI because this court has yet to issue the judgment that makes those taxes
due. With respect to the – I understand that the County’s position. I understand
they want to claim interest. But CTI did comply with every statutory requirement
of CTI. Pay their taxes when due. Pay the amount due when due. They paid on the
18 million. They paid on the 10. They paid on the 10.5 in 2017. They paid when
due.
(Tr., pp. 458-59, l. 7-25, 1-7) (emphasis added).
The District Court then properly noted:
All right. And I guess that’s my ultimate question. There is a framework in the
statute for charging late fees and interest if there’s delinquency. And ultimately the
question is whether there’s a delinquency under the statute.
(Tr., pp. 461-62, ll. 24-25, 1-3). On June 21, 2018, the District Court entered its Memorandum
Decision and Order on Additional Property Taxes, Late Charges, and Interest (R., pp. 327-332).
This District Court specifically held that SSI “paid all taxes when due.” (R., p. 330) (emphasis
added). The District Court concluded that SSI was not required to pay late charges or interest on
the additional taxes due. (R., p. 331). Judgment was entered accordingly that same day. (R., pp.
338-39).
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II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

SSI repeats its Issues on Appeal submitted in the Appellant’s Brief. Canyon County filed
its Respondent’s Brief asserting the following arguments with regard to the issues presented by
SSI’s appeal:
1. Is the District Court’s finding regarding the 2016 assessed value of the property
supported by substantial and competent evidence?
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in permitting the testimony of Cook?
III.

ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL

In addition to those issues presented in SSI’s appeal, the following issues have been
presented by Canyon County on Cross-Appeal:
1. Did the District Court err in ruling that SSI was not obligated to pay penalties and
interest on the unpaid amount of property taxes ultimately owed based on the assessed
value found by the court?
IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL

In this case, the District Court denied Canyon County’s request for late fees and interest
pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 63-201, 63-903, 63-1001, and 63-3812. The construction and
application of a statute are pure questions of law over which the appellate courts exercise free
review. Canyon County Board of Equalization v. Amalgamated Sugar Company, LLC, 143 Idaho
58, 60, 137 P.3d 445, 447 (2006).
V.

ARGUMENT

The District Court erred when it concluded, as a matter of law, that the Board of Tax
Appeals’ (“BOTA”) decision of value was erroneous because Canyon County did not present
adequate evidence to meet its burden of proof to allow the District Court to overrule the BOTA
decision. The District Court further erred when it concluded as a matter of law that the market
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value of the Property was $17,000,000, an amount seventy-percent (70%) higher than the BOTA
market value of the Property. The District Court erred in making this valuation determination
because (i) the District Court did not follow Idaho law and administrative procedure rules in
rendering its decision on market value, and (ii) the District Court failed to apply the proper
formulas to determine market value of the Property, i.e. the income approach, cost approach, and
sales comparison approach.
Canyon County did not directly address SSI’s Issues Presented on Appeal in its brief.
Rather, Canyon County identified its own version of those issues. SSI asserts it original Issues
Presented on Appeal as if fully set forth herein, but for purposes of brevity, SSI will address
Canyon County’s issues in the manner presented in Respondent’s Brief.
1. Is the District Court’s Finding Regarding the 2016 Assessed Value of the Property
Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence?
Canyon County incorrectly asserts that the “finding” of the assessed value of the Property
was that of fact. It is not. The determination of value for real property is an issue of law. Appellate
courts exercise free review over the district court’s conclusions of law to determine whether the
court correctly stated the applicable law and whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the
facts found. PacifiCorp v. Idaho State Tax Com’n, 153 Idaho 759, 291 P.3d 442 (2012).
In this case, the District Court made three conclusions of law that are challenged by SSI,
(1) “Petitioner has met its burden to show that the value of the property exceeds $10,000,000;” (2)
“The conclusion of the Board of Tax Appeals was erroneous;” and (3) “The market value of the
property on January 1, 2016 was, for ad valorem tax purposes, $17,000,000.” (R., p. 265).
Canyon County asserts that the District Court’s conclusions were “supported by substantial
and competent evidence.” Respondent/Cross Appellant’s Brief, p. 16. Canyon County further
states, “SSI wants to ignore this standard and re-litigate the matter in this Court, arguing cap rates,

APPELLANT-CROSS-RESPONDENT’S REPLY BRIEF, Page 4

depreciation, comparable sales, obsolescence, the value of improvements, definition of market
value, and the three approaches to determining market value.” Id., pp. 17-18. To the contrary,
SSI is asking this Court to exercise free review over the three Conclusions of Law made by the
District Court, as is the appropriate standard of review for judicial review appeals.
SSI is not trying to “relitigate” the issues in the judicial review litigation. SSI filed its
appeal with this Court to make a determination if the District Court properly applied the legal
standards to the present property tax appeal. SSI contends that the District Court did not.
In an action tried to a court without a jury, the trial court is required to find the facts
specially and state its conclusions of law separately which support its decision. I.R.C.P. 52(a).
“The purpose behind requiring the court to ‘find the facts specially and state separately the
conclusions of law thereon’ is to afford the appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of
the trial court’s decision, so that it might be determined whether the trial court applied the proper
law to the appropriate facts in reaching its ultimate judgment in the case.” Pope v. Intermountain
Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988 (1982).
SSI asserts that the District Court incorrectly identified Conclusions of Law in its Findings
of Fact. For example, the District Court found, “Based on the testimony and evidence presented
at trial, the Court finds that the cost approach was the most appropriate, credible, and reliable
appraisal method for determining market value of the Wilder Plant.” (R., p. 262). This is a
Conclusion of law and should not be stated in the Findings of Facts. Another example, the District
Court found, “the sales comparison approach is less reliable than the cost approach when applied
to the Wilder Plant. The sales comparison approach raised too many issues in this case with
adjustments made for post-sale investments, as evidenced by the three expert witnesses’ lack of
agreement as to how to account for such expenditures.” (R., p. 262). Again, the District Court

APPELLANT-CROSS-RESPONDENT’S REPLY BRIEF, Page 5

included this Conclusion of Law in its Findings of Fact. Likewise, the District Court found, “The
income approach is likewise less reliable than the cost approach.” (R., p. 263). These are legal
conclusions over which this Court exercises free review.
SSI contends that the District Court should have considered each of the three valuation
methods in its Conclusions of Law, so this Court could understand how the District Court
concluded that the Property was valued seventy percent (70%) higher than the BOTA found. If
the District Court would have conducted the correct legal analysis of the three approaches, SSI
trusts it would have concluded that the BOTA did not err. Instead, the District Court simply relied
upon the testimony and appraisal of J. Philip Cook (“Cook”), when it concluded the market value
of the Property was $17,000,000.
Canyon County directs this Court to Wurzburg v. Kootenai County, 155 Idaho 236, 308
P.3d 396 (Ct. App. 2013), to support the District Court’s Findings of Fact in this matter. While
Wurzburg is instructive on the issue of establishing who has the burden of proof in property tax
appeals, the case is less instructive on how district courts should actually apply the three methods
of valuation in any given case. Wurzburg was very fact specific to the Kootenai County property
tax valuation in that case and did not offer any guidance on how this Court should address
conclusions of law based on the facts presented at trial.
SSI, rather, would direct this Court to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, which
governs how assessors, appraisers, and courts should determine market value of property for ad
valorem purposes. The relevant provisions of IDAPA states:
Appraisal Approaches. Three (3) approaches to value will be considered on all
property. The three (3) approaches to market value are:
a. The sales comparison approach;
b. The cost approach; and
c. The income approach.
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IDAPA 35.01.03.217.02.
This Court has, on numerous occasions, discussed the three approaches in decisions related
to property tax valuation. See Pacificorp v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n. The Pacificorp case is more
instructive than Wurzburg because it confirms that district courts and appellate courts are tasked
with making decisions based on the application of the three methods. Id. at 782, 291 P.3d at 445.
In most cases, decisions are based on competing experts who merely differ on subjective areas in
appraising property. In Pacificorp and Wurzburg, the district courts made factual findings based
on the testimony of experts, the deep analysis of those experts at trial, and the specific factual
issues in each case. This case, however, is distinguishable. In this case, the expert witnesses did
not agree on which of the three approaches were appropriate, nor did the expert witnesses agree
on how the three approaches applied to the SSI Property. Furthermore, the expert witnesses
fundamentally disagreed on how to analyze each approach. SSI contends that Canyon County’s
experts, Michael Cowan (“Cowan”) and Cook, were incorrect in how they analyzed the three
approaches.
A.

The Sales Comparison Approach

Canyon County posited that when using the sales comparison approach, large adjustments
must be made to the properties, resulting in adjustments which overall ranged from roughly +300%
to +480%. Canyon County contended the adjustments were proper because at the time the
industrial properties were sold, they needed significant reconfiguration and updating work to
become active food processing operations. Canyon County simply took the total costs of the tenant
improvements, the sources of which are unknown, for each sale and added them to the respective
sale prices. For example, in the case of Amy’s Kitchen, the most similarly related property, Cowan
added $25 million in value without explanation or verification. This effectively took the property
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from $23 per square foot to $112 per square foot, with no further explanation as to why market
value should increase 480%.
SSI’s expert, Paul Hyde (“Hyde”) completely disagreed that these exceptional adjustments
were a proper way to analyze the sales comparison approach. To the contrary, SSI did not make
these outlandish adjustments to comparable properties. To do so would be an admission that the
properties were not comparable at all, if an adjustment of 300-480% were necessary. SSI’s expert
properly used eleven (11) comparable properties, made appropriate and well-reasoned
adjustments, and concluded a value of $6,500,000 under this approach.
The District Court did not independently analyze the sales comparison approach. It merely
found that because the three experts could not agree on how to make costs-after-sale adjustments,
that the methodology was “less reliable than the cost approach.” (R., p. 262). The District Court
did not elaborate as to why it made this factual finding, nor did the District Court make any
Conclusions of Law related to the sales comparison approach. Consequently, the District Court
clearly erred by failing to properly analyze this recognized appraisal methodology.
B.

The Cost Approach

SSI did not rely on the cost approach because its expert deemed it to be too unreliable due
to the older age of the Property and the lack of support for accurately estimating potential
functional and economic obsolescence. Canyon County, however, relied heavily on the cost
approach.
Canyon County did not appear to have a clear understanding as to the applicability of
functional and external obsolescence. First Canyon County’s expert and employee, Michael
Cowan, attributed ten percent (10%) functional obsolescence to the Property (Ex. 1012, p. 12),
then twenty-five percent (25%) in his revised report. (Ex. 1013, p. 26). There is no market
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evidence of any kind to support these amounts, they were simply guesses on his part. The actual
amount of functional obsolescence and external obsolescence is likely much higher than 25%.
SSI’s plant engineer, Dave Kubosumi, testified that the Property was only ten percent (10%)
efficient, or conversely ninety percent (90%) obsolete. (Tr., p. 177, ll. 15-18). Due to the age,
configuration, layout, location and many other factors, the quantification of the amount of
functional obsolescence and external obsolescence of the Property is unknown. The best way to
estimate depreciation from all causes, including obsolescence, is to extract it from the market. In
order to extract it, similar properties that have sold must be analyzed in great detail and sufficient
information must be available to make this type of analysis. Canyon County made no attempt to
provide any evidence to support Cowan’s percentage of functional obsolescence to the Property.
The District Court did not do an independent cost approach analysis in its Conclusions of
Law. Rather, the District Court found as fact that “the cost approach was the most appropriate,
credible, and reliable in determining the market value of the Wilder Plant.” (R., p. 262). The
District Court failed to address any of the issues discussed by Hyde at trial or addressed at length
in his appraisal (Ex. 1001) or appraisal review (Ex. 1002). The District Court erred by relying
solely on the cost approach (although no Conclusion of Law indicated as such). Based on the
District Court’s Findings of Fact, the cost approach was the only “reliable” recognized
methodology, therefore, the District Court clearly erred when it presumably used the cost approach
to determine market value of the Property.
C.

The Income Approach

SSI also used the income approach to value the Property. The income approach is
consistent with industry application for valuing properties of this kind. The parties agreed, and
the District Court recognized, that special-use industrial properties like the Property are not

APPELLANT-CROSS-RESPONDENT’S REPLY BRIEF, Page 9

typically leased to unrelated entities. (R., p. 263). Rather, such properties are typically owneroccupied and operated. SSI’s expert, Hyde, testified regarding the difficulty in getting local lease
data, given the nature of the food processing plant, but nonetheless, Hyde was able to identify
fourteen (14) comparable leased facilities throughout the United States. (Tr., p. 208, ll. 4-9). After
identifying how the income approach is calculated, SSI’s expert concluded the value of the
Property was $6,100,000 under the income approach. (Tr., p. 211, ll. 18-22; Ex. 1001, pp. 18081).
Canyon County offered no evidence to refute SSI’s income approach calculation, nor did
Cowan do an income approach in his report or revised report.
The District Court simply made the factual finding that “[t]he income approach is likewise
less reliable than the cost approach.” (R., p. 263). The District Court made no Conclusion of Law
that it had analyzed the income approach as a recognized method of appraisal, nor did the District
Court make any conclusion as to how the income approach should be applied in determining
market value of the Property. Therefore, the District Court clearly erred by failing to consider the
income approach as a recognized method for determining market value.
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in permitting the testimony of
Cook?
When reviewing the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse of
discretion standard. Lepper v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc., 160 Idaho 104, 369 P.3d 882
(2016); Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163-64, 45 P.3d 816, 819-20
(2002). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue as
discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and
(3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason. O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145
Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008).
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Typically, where the disclosure requirements of I.R.C.P. 26 are not met, an improperly
disclosed expert will be excluded from testifying. Aguilar v. Coonrod, 151 Idaho 642, 646, 262
P.3d 671, 675 (2011). Canyon County’s court-ordered deadline to disclose expert witnesses was
one hundred-sixty (160) days prior to trial. (R., p. 23). One hundred-sixty (160) days prior to the
trial in this case was on or before October 11, 2017. Canyon County retained Cook in October of
2017, to conduct an appraisal of the SSI Property. As part of his responsibilities as Canyon
County’s expert witness, Cook came up with his own information, new information, and a new
theory as to the value of the SSI Property. Cook’s appraisal report contained a new valuation and
new data relied upon to reach his opinion as to the market value of the Property. The appraisal
report was certainly not prepared by Cook to rebut SSI’s case, Cook was hired to make his own
determination of value of the SSI Property. Canyon County deliberately hid the fact that they
retained Cook in October 2017 to gain an advantage over SSI. Canyon County literally kept their
competing expert witness and his expert witness report a secret in order to have a better outcome
in court. SSI had no knowledge of the expert report until December 20, 2017, allowing no time to
meaningfully refute any evidence presented by Cook.
Canyon County continues to assert that Cook was a “rebuttal” expert. Cook was not a
rebuttal expert, he offered his own opinions of value that should have been disclosed in accordance
with the District Court’s scheduling order. Rebuttal evidence is given to explain, repel, counteract,
or disprove facts given in evidence by the opposing party and cannot be used to advance new
arguments or new evidence. Because Cook’s testimony and appraisal report were new evidence,
he should not have been allowed to testify as to his own values and his appraisal report.
The District Court should have stricken Cook’s appraisal from use at trial and the District
Court should not have allowed Cook to testify as to his opinion of value of the SSI Property. In its
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Memorandum Decision on SSI’s Motion to Exclude Expert Witness, the District Court concluded:
“Mr. Cook was designated as a rebuttal expert and his testimony would be limited to rebutting
conclusions of Respondent’s expert, Mr. Hyde.” (R., p. 180). Despite the deadline in the Order
Setting Trial, and the recognition that Cook’s testimony was limited to rebuttal testimony, the
District Court denied SSI’s Motion to Exclude Expert Witness. (R., p. 812). The District Court
did not set forth the abuse of discretion elements in its Memorandum Decision.
At trial, after SSI’s case in chief, Canyon County introduced Cook as a witness. SSI reraised its motion to exclude the expert witness. (Tr., p. 339, ll. 22-25, p. 340, ll. 1-5). After lengthy
discussion on the issue, SSI argued that Cook was not a rebuttal expert, but rather he was going to
be testifying to his own opinion of value, with his own appraisal report. Despite the objection, the
District Court stated, “I am going to allow the witness to testify. I will allow him to opine as to
why he believes the opinion of Mr. Hyde is incorrect. I will also allow him to express his opinion
of value.” (Tr., p. 345, ll. 21-25) (emphasis added). The District Court ultimately allowed Cook
to testify about all matters discussed in the trial, including Cowan’s reports, Hyde’s appraisal, and
appraisal review of Cowan, and the District Court allowed, over SSI’s objections, Cook’s appraisal
to be admitted. (Tr., p. 399, ll. 3-15). The District Court did not do an abuse of discretion analysis
when it overruled SSI’s objections.
The District Court abused its discretion by allowing Cook to testify because the District
Court appeared to rely solely on Cook and his appraisal to determine the market value of the
Property, completely prejudicing SSI. With his appraisal in hand, Cook opined that the market
value of the Property was $17,000,000. (Tr., p. 403, ll. 5-10). On cross examination, Cook
admitted he was retained prior to December 20, 2017, and up until trial, he had already billed
Canyon County approximately $45,000.00. (Tr., p. 404, ll. 20-23). Cook further testified that he
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did not independently research the data given to him by Cowan, and further that he relied on a
newspaper article for his final opinion as to value. (Tr., pp. 421-422, ll. 4-25, 1-11).
Accordingly, SSI respectfully requests this Court determine the District Court committed
an abuse of discretion in classifying Cook as a rebuttal expert and allowing his testimony and
appraisal report to be used at the trial.
VI.
1.

ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL

Did the District Court err in ruling that SSI was not obligated to pay
penalties and interest on the unpaid amount of property taxes ultimately
owed based on the assessed value found by the court?

Canyon County asserts, in its Cross-Appeal, that the District Court erred when it declined
to impose penalties and interest against SSI for the 2016 tax year. The District Court did not err
when it refused to impose any penalties and interest because no tax was actually due until the
District Court entered its final judgment in the judicial review litigation.
Title 63 of the Idaho Code governs the payment of property taxes, late charges, and interest
and provides:
Property tax payments may be paid in full or paid in two halves, with the first have
being due on or before December 20 of the year in which the property taxes are
levied with a grace period extending to June 20 for the second half if the first half
is totally paid.
Idaho Code § 63-903(1). Late charges and interest will be assessed if the second one-half of the
payment is not totally paid on or before June 20 and if the second one-half has been partially paid,
late charges and interest shall be calculated on the remaining property tax due. Idaho Code § 63903(4). Idaho Code § 63-201(12) defines ‘late charge’ as a charge of two percent (2%) of the
delinquency, and a payment is considered delinquent when “any property tax, special assessment,
fee, collection cost, or charge collected in the same manner as a property tax has not been paid in
the manner and within the time limits provided by law.” Idaho Code § 63-201(7).
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When handling an appeal from a Board of Tax Appeals order, a district court has the
authority to direct the collection of additional taxes pursuant to I.C. § 63-3812(c). An appeal of a
BOTA decision does not suspend the payment of taxes pending any appeal per Idaho Code § 63381(d).
In 2016, the Canyon County Assessor assessed SSI Property at $18,286,630.00 and on June
25, 2016 SSI protested this assessment. On August 8, 2016, SSI appealed this assessment to the
BOTA. During the pendency of the BOTA appeal, SSI paid the first half of the property tax
assessment in December 2016, which was based on the $18,286,630 valuation. The second half of
SSI’s property tax assessment was due June 20, 2017, and on March 31, 2017, the BOTA
determined the value of the Property was $10,000,000 instead of $18,286,630. The parties agreed
that the BOTA decision would be controlling and Canyon County adjusted SSI’s tax bill
accordingly, to which SSI paid the second half of the taxes based on that amount. By 2017, SSI
had paid its 2016 property taxes in full.
The District Court, after the trial in March 2018, determined the 2016 value of the Property
to be $17,000,000 and as such an additional $97,770.12 was due for the SSI 2016 property tax
assessment. (R., pp. 327-332) Judgment ordering SSI to pay the property taxes was entered on
June 21, 2018, rendering the taxes due at that point. (R., pp. 338-39). SSI promptly paid the
assessed taxes. SSI does not owe any late charges or interest payments in accordance with Idaho
law because the additional taxes only became due upon the District Court’s Judgment, as allowed
by Idaho Code § 63-3812. SSI did not receive any delinquent tax notifications, paid each half of
the assessed taxes on time, and remitted the additional charges per the Judgment in a timely
manner. Because there were no delinquent payments and because there are no outstanding
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payments owed, SSI is not responsible for any late charges or interest due as alleged by Canyon
County.
VII.

ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL

Canyon County is not entitled to attorney’s fees on its Cross-Appeal, nor is it entitled to
fees on SSI’s appeal. The Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 allow for an award of costs and attorney
fees to the prevailing party. Attorney fees on appeal are appropriate under I.A.R. 41 if the appellate
court is left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 74, 785 P.2d 634,
638 (1990).
In this case, SSI appealed the underlying decision of the District Court and SSI has sought
attorney fees on appeal. Likewise, Canyon County appealed the District Court’s denial of its
request for penalties and interest on property taxes not yet due by SSI, seeking fees for its appeal.
Because the District Court was correct in denying Canyon County’s request, Canyon County
would not be the prevailing party on its Cross-Appeal. Therefore, SSI respectfully requests this
Court deny Canyon County’s request for attorney’s fees on its Cross-Appeal. Furthermore, as fully
set forth in SSI’s Appellants’ Brief, SSI should be awarded its fees if it prevails on this appeal.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The District Court erred in issuing insufficient Conclusions of Law that set the Property
value at $17,000,000, without explanation or proper valuation. The District Court further erred in
allowing Canyon County’s late disclosed expert witness to testify and admit his report into
evidence at the trial in this matter. Finally, the District Court properly denied Canyon County’s
request for penalties and interest on property taxes not yet due by SSI. Accordingly, SSI
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respectfully requests this Court to 1) determine that the District Court erred and reverse the
decision of the District Court, and 2) affirm the BOTA’s Property valuation at $10,000,000.
DATED: February 13, 2019.
PICKENS COZAKOS, P.A.

By

/s/ Terri Pickens Manweiler
Terri Pickens Manweiler, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant / CrossRespondent
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